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Georgia had recently instituted a new post-conviction remedy,
decided to hold petitioner's application for habeas corpus in
abeyance until the new Georgia remedy could be tried. The same
"hold-in-abeyance" attitude toward new state post-conviction
remedies can be found in a number of other cases in widely
divergent geographical areas, including the courts of appeals in
5 4
the third, ninth and tenth circuits.
It is true that in some circuits the federal courts have taken
a negative approach, announcing that unless the state demonstrates a "swift and imperative" remedy, federal courts will
grant application for habeas corpus."5 At present, the effectiveness of state "due process" remedies is, at the worst, an open
question; and it would be premature to jettison the "due process"
ground from Louisiana's expanded post-conviction remedy.
The guiding principle in this matter should, hopefully, be the
one enunciated in Fay v. Noia, where Mr. Justice Brennan stated
that, "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government
for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction
without an opportunity for the state courts to correct a consti5' 6
tutional violation."
EVIDENCE
George W. Pugh*
BURDEN OF PROOF

"No Doubt at All"
What is the burden of proof required to change an entry on
a birth certificate as to race? State ex rel. Pritchardv. Louisiana
State Board of Health' was an action brought by a person
designated as "colored" on her birth certificate to correct it to
reflect that she is a member of the white race. The court considered "established" that relator had "lived as a white person"
54. In Hill v. Dutton, 277 F. Supp. 324 (N.D. Ga. 1967), the court agreed
that "Georgia has equipped itself with flexible adequate tools to meet Georgia's
responsibility in the vindication of federal constitutional rights in the trial of
criminal cases. This is where it belongs. The role of the Federal Courts will be,
as it should be, more and more reduced." Id. at 326. See also United States
ex rel. Singer v. Myers, 384 F.2d 279 (3d Cir. 1967); United States ex rel.
Walker v. Young, 388 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1967) ; Kennell v. Crouse, 384 F.2d 811
(10th Cir. 1967) ; Childress v. Beto, 273 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Tex. 1967) ; Knox
v. Maxwell, 277 F. Supp. 593 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
55. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Harper v. Rundle, 278 F. Supp. 819 (E.D.
Pa. 1968) ; United States ex rel. Shelton v. Rundle, 279 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa.
1967).
56. 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 (1963).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 198 So.2d 490 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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and had been "accepted as such by the community in which she
[lived] '12 as had been alleged in the petition. Nevertheless the
court took the position, citing authorities, that in order for
relator to win she must establish her right to be registered
"white" by more than merely the preponderance of evidence,
more even than the test required in criminal cases (beyond a
reasonable doubt), but must establish it beyond any doubt at
all. With deference, it is submitted that to accord these Public
Health records such an august and sacrosanct position is unwarranted, and not in keeping with the legislation 3 and the
jurisprudence taken in its entirety. To give such an administrative classification as to race, arrived at without notice and
hearing, the status of practically a rule of law seems an undue
obeisance to bureaucratic records-one which might well be in
violation of the due process of law requirements of the fourteenth
amendment.
The unusual test of the Pritchard case seems to find its
genesis in Green v. City of New Orleans4 which seems to have
misapplied language contained in the Sunseri5 and Treadaway
cases. Both Sunseri and Treadaway concern actions in which
persons commonly accepted as members of the white race were
designated as "colored" in the public records. In Sunseri, plaintiff, a white man, brought suit to annul his marriage on the
ground that his wife was "a person of color, having a traceable
amount of negro blood."' 7 In evidence were certificates of the
Recorder of Births and Marriages of the Parish of Orleans, one
of which recited that the defendant was "colored." The court
correctly stated that the recitals of the certificates are "presumably correct" but that since defendant insisted that they
were not correct and that she could show the true facts, the
court would remand the case "since her marriage should not
be annulled on the ground that she is a member of the Negro
race unless all the evidence adduced leaves no room for doubt
that such is the case." It is to be stressed that the Sunseri case
did not say that the certificates' recitals are to be accepted as
conclusive unless defendant proves beyond any doubt that they
were in error-its thrust was quite to the contrary. The fact
2. Id. at 491.
3. LA. R.S. 40:159 (1950).
4. 88 So.2d 76 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956).
5. Sunseri v. Cassagne, 191 La. 209, 185 So. 1 (1938).
6. State ex rel. Treadaway v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 221 La. 1048,
61 So.2d 735 (1952).
7. 191 La. 209, 211, 185 So. 1, 2 (1938).
8. Id. at 223, 185 So. at 5.
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that the record recited that the defendant was "colored" was
insufficient to establish the plaintiff's case. The marriage was
to be upheld and hence the wife to be considered "white" if there
was any doubt as to the matter. The Sunseri case speaks of the
public records as being "presumably correct" and the Supreme
Court has properly cited 9 the Sunseri case as standing for the
proposition that a prima facie case is made out by the certificate's recitals. The present statute ° similarly states that certificates on file in the division of public health statistics are
"prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The Orleans Court of Appeal on rehearing in the Treadaway
case, 1 in a mandamus proceeding by a person to change the
public record classification from "colored" to "white," interpreted the Sunseri case as meaning that a person who has been
commonly accepted as a member of the Caucasian race "should
not be held to be of the colored race 'unless all the evidence
adduced leaves no room for doubt that such is the case.' ",12 Again,
the fact that the public health records classified a party as
"colored" was not to be deemed conclusive. Despite the records,
under the circumstances, for reclassification, there must be
"no doubt at all.""1 Finding that there was "no room for
doubt"'14 as to its accuracy, the court of appeal upheld the
recital. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, using a different formulation, however, as to the burden of proof' 5-one
much more in favor of the public health record recital, but by
no means according them the sacrosanct quality given them
later in the court of appeal decisions.
The first case to take the position that a person attacking
the classification of race contained in a birth or death certificate must prove his case by more even than beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., beyond any doubt, was Green v. City of New
9. Villa v. Lacoste, 213 La. 654, 35 So.2d 419 (1948).
10. LA. R.S. 40:159 (1950).
11. State ex rel. Treadaway v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 56 So.2d 249
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952), affirmed by the Supreme Court, with a different formulation, however, with respect to the burden of proof question, 221 La. 1048, 61
So.2d 735 (1952).
12. 56 So.2d 249 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952).
13. Id. at 250.
14. Id.
15. 221 La. 1048, 1060, 61 So.2d 735, 739 (1952) : "Relator must show that
he has a clear legal right to have the correction made. The legal certainty of the
proof submitted must be such as to compel the Registrar of Vital Statistics to
perform the ministerial duty of changing the recordation from "Colored" to
"White." The proof of record falls far short of any such assumption. As the name
indicates, the records kept by the Registrar are vital to the general public welfare. The registration of a birthright must be given as much sanctity in the law
as the registration of a property right."
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Orleans,16 which, it is submitted, rested upon a misinterpretation of the Sunseri and Treadaway litigation. Green was a mandamus action by a Negro, seeking to adopt a child, to have the
child's birth certificate designation changed from "white" to
"colored." The "no doubt at all" language which had been used
to protect a person generally accepted as "white" from designation as "colored" on a public health record certificate was for
the first time applied to uphold birth certificate designation-a
use quite the opposite from its origins. Green was followed in
later cases. 17 In one of these, State ex rel. Cousin v. Louisiana
State Board of Health,"' the Supreme Court granted writs, perhaps to overturn the Green line of cases, but the appeal was
dismissed as moot when the applicant died. The notion that
granting of writs may suggest disinclination on the part of the
Supreme Court to follow Green was perhaps reflected in a later
court of appeal case. 1'9
Although the instant case certainly finds support in the
later jurisprudence of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal,20 it
is again submitted that these decisions rest upon a misinterpretation of prior cases. It is hoped that they will be overturned by
the Louisiana Supreme Court and that recitals in the public
health records will be given only the authority stipulated by
statute-prima facie proof of the facts therein stated.
If we as citizens are to be classified by race on birth and
death certificates, then at least classification should be fairly
done, with fair and reasonable procedures available to eradicate
error. 21 A person's race should clearly not be administratively
determined with no practical redress in the courts. If the state
16. 88 So.2d 76 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956).
17. See State ex rel. Cousin v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 138 So.2d
829 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) and State eT rel. Lytell v. Louisiana State Board
of Health, 153 So.2d 498 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
18. 138 So.2d 829 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
19. State ex rel. Lytell v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 153 So.2d 498,
503 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
20. State ex rel. Cousin v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 138 So.2d 829
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). See also State ex rel. Francis v. Louisiana State
Board of Health, 179 So.2d 681 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965), cited by the court in
its opinion.
21. Interestingly, a humane recent statute provides a relatively simple procedure for changing sex classification on birth certificates after anatomical change
of sex by medical techniques. In such cases the statute provides that: "The court
shall require such proof as it deems necessary to be convinced that the petitioner
was properly diagnosed as a transsexual or pseudo hermaphrodite, that sex reassignment or corrective surgery has been properly performed upon the petitioner,
and that as a result of such surgery and subsequent medical treatment the anatomical structure of the sex of the petitioner has been changed to a sex other
than that which is stated on the original birth certificate of the petitioner. LA.
R.S. 40:336. Added by Acts 1968, No. 611, § 1."

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

can take a man's life by proving its case beyond a reasonable
doubt, then surely in order to prove that the state's records are
in error, a citizen should not have to prove his case "beyond
any doubt."
Stopping Charts
In 1967, in Guidry v. GrainDealers Mut. Ins. Co., 22 the Court
of Appeal for the Third Circuit cited the Bergeron2 3 case from
the First Circuit as one of the few cases holding stopping charts
to be "admissible as independant evidence. ' ' 24 The Third Circuit
expressly disagreed with the Bergeron case and went further to
state that unless the charts have been properly introduced in
evidence "with proof that they are reasonably accurate and
relevant to the facts of the particular case, they should be used
by the court with great caution; i.e., they should be used only
for broad general comparisons and not for precise calculations
to determine speed or stopping distances. 2 5 Apparently the
court felt that judicial notice would justify use for broad general comparisons, and in such cases there is no need for charts
actually to be introduced in evidence. With this the writer
agrees.
During the past term, the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit in Picard v. Joffrion26 stated that it did not agree that
its prior decision in Bergeron "represents the view" that stopping charts are admissible as independent evidence, and there' 27
after made an effort to "dispel such idea for all time.
As recognized in Picard, where stopping charts are sought
to be introduced as independant evidence, there is a hearsay
problem, for the individual who prepared the charts is not
present in court, under oath and subject to cross-examination.
To overcome the hearsay difficulty, both Picard and Guidry
agree that evidence must be introduced to show accuracy, apparently taking the position that in such event the charts
become part of the sworn testimony of the expert witness on the
stand, who himself testifies to their accuracy. There is language
in the Picard case, however, which seems contrary to that of
Guidry, for Picard states that Guidry holds stopping charts
"should not be considered by the court where they are not in22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

193 So.2d 873 (La. App.
Bergeron v. Hetherwick,
193 So.2d 873, 876 (La.
Id. at 877.
202 So.2d 372 (La. App.
Id. at 375.

3d Cir. 1967).
140 So.2d 440 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
App. 3d Cir. 1967).
1st Cir. 1967).
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whereas from the above quoted lan-

guage of Guidry, it seems quite clear that Guidry would permit judicial notice of stopping charts for "broad general comparisons," although not "for precise calculations to determine
speed or stopping distances." Later cases in the First and Third
Circuits seem to this writer also to reflect this inconsistency.2 9
The writer agrees with the approach taken in the Third Circuit.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Recesses and Continuances
The trial judge, of course, is in control of litigation in his
court, and necessarily is vested with very broad discretion as to
the means and method by which litigants may present their
evidence. When and under what circumstances a litigant should
be granted a recess or continuance is likewise a matter properly
falling within the broad sound discretion of the trial judge.
Rarely should the trial court's grant or denial be upset upon
appeal. Seldom would such action by the trial court constitute
denial of due process of law within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment, but in the opinion of this writer, it may be that
State v. Skinner 30 presents such a case.

The unusual facts were these. Three defendants were jointly
charged and tried before a twelve-man jury for narcotics violations, and sentences ranging from ten to fifty years (under the
multiple offender statute) 31 were imposed. The state rested
its case at 11:40 p.m. One of defense counsel, referring to the
unquestioned fact that he was a sick man suffering from diabetes, and contending that he was "mortally tired," stated that
he had about ten to twelve witnesses to put on the stand, and
in effect asked for a recess or continuance until the next day.
The trial court, reflecting considerable annoyance with defense
counsel for past conduct and prior continuances, said that he
would grant him a three-minute recess. Defense counsel then
moved for a mistrial, which was denied, and a thirty-five-minute
recess in fact ensued. From 12:25 a.m. until 2:45 a.m. defense
counsel put on their case via seventeen witnesses (some of
whom were character witnesses). Thereafter the court did recess until 9:30 a.m. the next day when closing arguments were
28. Id.
29. See Cole v. Maryland Cas. Co., 205 So.2d 863 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968)
Wheat v. Cutrer, 206 So.2d 573 (La.. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
30. 251 La. 300, 204 So.2d 370 (1967), writs granted, 88 S. Ct. 2031 (1968).
31. LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (1950) as amended, La. Acts 1958, No. 469, § 1.
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held. Defendants contended and produced some evidence to show
that two of the jurors were sleeping during the presentation of a
portion of the evidence. The Supreme Court, however, agreed
with the trial court's finding that this was not the case. The
court held that the trial court's denial of defendants' motion
for a continuance and of its later motions for mistrial and new
trial was not reversible error-that defendants' substantive
rights were neither violated nor prejudiced. With great deference, it is submitted that to insure fundamental fairness and to
prevent setting an unfortunate precedent for the future a new
trial should have been granted.
Celerity in trial court procedure is certainly "a consummation devoutly to be wish'd, ' '32 but a too speedy trial may be too
much of a good thing. There is suggestion in the record that
the trial court may have become exasperated with defense counsel's prior continuances and conduct, and this is, of course, very
understandable in the give and take of trial. The Supreme
Court found that defense counsel remained "astute, thorough
and vigorous" with no "lack of alertness or perception. ' 33 However, in this writer's opinion, the exceedingly long hours and
marathon trial, especially in light of defense counsel's very
serious illness, cast a cloud upon the proceedings.
RELEVANCY

Character
3 4

In State v. Chapman the Supreme Court held that letters
expressing the opinion of the writer as to the good character
of a defendant in a criminal case are irrelevant and hence excludable by the trial court ex proprio motu. The writer certainly
agrees with the trial court's and the Supreme Court's characterization of the letters as hearsay.35 Further, under R.S. 15:479
and 483, it is quite clear that good character is to be shown only
by general reputation and not by individual personal opinion of
the defendant, 6 and this is an additional reason for saying that
the letters are inadmissible. To say, however, that personal opinion is irrelevant-which is tantamount to saying that it has no
32. HAMLET, act III, sc. 1.
33. 251 La. 300, 348, 204 So.2d 370, 387 (1967).
34. 251 La. 1089, 208 So.2d 686 (1968).
35. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1958-1959 TermEvidence, 20 LA. L. Ruv. 335, 336 (1960).
36. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1955-1956 TermEvidence, 17 LA. L. REv. 421 (1957) and The Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1958-1959 Term-Evidence, 20 LA. L. REv. 335 (1960).
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tendency in reason to establish a material proposition37-seems
inaccurate. A personal opinion that the defendant is not the kind
of person who would commit the crime might well tend to show
that he is not the kind of person who would commit the crimeand hence tend to show that he did not in fact commit the
39
3s
crime. Professor Wigmore and the Uniform Rules of Evidence
both take the position that personal opinion on the question of0
character is relevant, and both feel that it should come in.4
A majority of American jurisdictions would agree with the
Louisiana statutory provisions that personal opinion to show
character is inadmissible, not because of irrelevancy, but be41
cause of other considerations.

WITNESSES

Inference from Failure to Call
Professor McCormick has cautioned us against "spinning a
web of rules ' ' 2 around the inference or so-called presumption
that may flow from failure of a party to call a witness under
certain circumstances. He suggests, and this writer agrees, that
rather than speak of "presumptions" in this area, it would be
preferable to talk of "inferences. ' ' 43 Since in civil cases Louisiana
appellate courts review both law and fact, 44 there are very few
jury trials, and hence both trial and appellate courts are called
upon to deal with factual matters with much more frequency
than their common law counterparts. Hence it is not surprising
that each year a number of appellate cases deal with the so-called
"presumption from failure to call," and the past term was no
4 5
exception.
37. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE R. 1(2) (1953).
38. See 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1980-86 (3d ed. 1940).
39. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE R. 46 (1953).
40. See also the discussion in MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 153-54, 158 (1954).
41. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 153-54 (1954).
42. 1 C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 249 (1954).
43. Id.
44. LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10, 29.
45. See Ardoin v. Boutte, 209 So.2d 754 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) ; Hebert v.
Farrington, 207 So.2d 789 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) ; Ruckstuhl & Fick, Inc. v.
Parish of Jefferson, 207 So.2d 170 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) ; Fidelity & Cas. Co.
of New York v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 205 So.2d 623 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1967) ; Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Batiste, 205 So.2d 71 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968) ;
Aguillard v. Home Ins. Co., 203 So.2d 745 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) ; Brooks v.
Fondren, 199 So.2d 588 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967) ; Delafosse v. Industrial Painters,
Inc., 199 So.2d 559 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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Whether in a particular trial a party's failure to call a witness is to be used against him is so much a part of the context
in which it arises that it is extremely difficult to formulate
hard and fast rules which will govern in future cases. It seems
to this writer that often in this area, rather than regarding
judicial pronouncements as "rules" it is preferable to construe
them as discussions and analyses of particular situations-valuable as principles and guidelines for arriving at factual conclusions in future cases. Illustration of this during the past term
46
is perhaps best found in White v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,
wherein the court stated:
"Counsel for defendants calls attention to the fact, and we
think it is of significance, that no representative of the contractor was called to support the testimony of some of the
witnesses for plaintiffs with regard to the road condition
and warning lights. Counsel for defendants says in his brief
that three employees of the contractor were summoned by
counsel for plaintiffs and personal service was made of the
subpoenas. The record contains these subpoenas showing
such service. These witnesses were not called to testify.
Ordinarily we would say that such witnesses were as available to defendants as to plaintiffs and would make no point
on the absence of their testimony. However, we believe that
if they were summoned by one attorney the other attorney
had the right to expect them to be called by the attorney who
had them summoned and if any presumption arises from the
fact that such witnesses were not called, such presumption
is chargeable against the attorney who summoned the witnesses. We think the situation here is sufficient to give rise
to the presumption that the testimony of these three James'
witnesses would not have been of assistance to plaintiffs'
contention." 47
It would be unfortunate, it seems to this writer, to interpret
the foregoing as a "rule" that the non-calling of a summonsed
witness is necessarily to result in an adverse inference. Whether
such an inference is or is not to be drawn depends, it is submitted, upon the factual context of each case. Normally it would
seem it should not be drawn.
Credibility
To what extent may a court in evaluating the testimony of a
witness take into consideration the testimony given by him on
46. 210 So.2d 580 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
47. Id. at 584.
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a prior occasion and not made part of the record in the instant
case? In Olds v. Ashley, 4 the Supreme Court said:
* . [The trial court] undertook to impeach Dr.
Tucker's
testimony on the basis of evidence the doctor had given in
other cases and not from any evidence, medical or otherwise,
of a contradictory nature that had been adduced in the case
at bar.
"This, we find the judge was without right to do. .... .49
With this the writer agrees. 50 The court goes on to say, citing
a long line of cases:
"For it is a familiar rule of law, approved time and time
again by this Court, that evidence of witnesses which stands
uncontradicted, as in this case, must be accepted as true."'51
Taken completely literally, this statement seems to the writer
to place the trial judge unnecessarily in a strait-jacket. If interpreted to mean, however, that the testimony of a witness
must be accepted if there is nothing to cause the court to disbelieve it other than things outside the record, the statement
seems thoroughly accurate: it is possible to conceive of situations where the testimony itself, though not "contradicted,"
may seem quite incredible, especially when the demeanor of the
witness is taken into consideration. In such cases there ought
to be no necessity for accepting it.
HEARSAY

Juvenile Proceedings
May hearsay evidence be received in a juvenile delinquency
or juvenile neglect proceeding, despite the fact that it does not
fit within any of the usually recognized exceptions to the rule?
La. R.S. 13:1579.1 would appear to this reader to answer in
the affirmative. The section provides:
"In the hearing of all cases under this Part, involving
petitions of juvenile delinquency or neglect, all facts connected therewith and all surrounding circumstances, including the environment and history of the child, together with
any character of evidence, including hearsay evidence and
opinion evidence which the court, in its discretion, may deem
48.
49.
50.
51.

250 La. 935, 200 So.2d 1 (1967).
Id. at 943, 200 So.2d at 4.
See the discussion in 26 LA. L. REV. 618-620 (1966).
250 La. 935, 943-44, 200 So.2d 1, 4 (1967).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

proper, may be admissible, and the testimony of the probation officer assigned to the case shall be admissible."
In In re State in Interest of Elliott,5 2 the Second Circuit Court
of Appeal, in an action brought at the instance of the Department of Public Welfare to obtain custody of three minor children
from their mother, held that the statute did not authorize the
receipt of otherwise inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence,
or case workers' ex parte reports. In so holding, the court seems
to this writer to be giving the statute a most strained construction. In this connection, the court stated:
"In the interpretation of statutes, the word 'may' means
'permissive.' LSA-R.S. 1:3, C.C.P. Art. 5053. The word denotes discretion, in this instance, on the part of the trier
of facts, that is, the court. A provision of a statute making
admissible in evidence particular characters of supposed
proof at the will, whim, or fancy of the court, which it may,
at its discretion, in one case admit and in another exclude,
establishes, in law, no rule of evidence which can be accorded
5' 3
any force or effect.
The court went on to state that if the statute were to be otherwise interpreted, it would be abrogated by the now famous
United States Supreme Court decision in In re Gault.54 Although
Gault will probably be interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court to preclude use of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence
in any delinquency proceeding which may result in the child's
being committed to an institution in which his freedom would be
curtailed, it is more questionable whether it will be extended
to preclude such hearsay in child neglect cases such as the
instant proceeding. It would not greatly surprise this writer,
however, if it is so extended.
CONFESSIONS, ADMISSIONS, AND EVIDENCE OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Confessions Containing References to Other Crimes
To protect a defendant from the prejudice that would otherwise result, it is generally stated that unless there is an inde52. 206 So.2d 802 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
53. Id. at 805.

54. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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pendant relevance (as, for example, to show knowledge, intent,
scheme, plan, etc.), 5 evidence of crimes other than that for
which defendant is being tried, is inadmissible. The principle
is an important one and of great significance for the protection of the rights of the accused. It partakes of our fundamental
notion that a defendant's character as to probability is not at
issue in a criminal case unless and until he chooses to place it
at issue.
Where, in an otherwise admissible confession, the defendant
has adverted to an unrelated crime which, apart therefrom
would be inadmissible, is (1) the confession therefore to be excluded, (2) that portion of the confession referring to the unrelated crime to be excised, or (3) the confession in its entirety to come in ?51 The matter was again considered in State
v. Cardinale.7 The lower court had, over defendant's objection,
permitted the entire statement to come in. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, relying upon the Maney,58 Evans,59 and
Bailey 0 cases and the provisions of R.S. 15:450.
Although the Cardinalecase is supported by both the Evans
and Maney decisions, those decisions rest upon State v. Bailey
which, it is submitted, is a very shaky foundation. All four cases
necessarily interpret R.S. 15:450, which provides:
"450.

Use of confession, admission or declarationin entirety

"Every confession, admission or declaration sought to be
used against any one must be used in its entirety, so that the
person to be affected thereby may have the benefit of any
exculpation or explanation that the whole statement may
afford." (Emphasis added.)
From a reading of the article, it seems clear that the provisions
of 15:450, like the past crime rule itself, were designed for the
protection of the defendant. The fact that a past crime is
referred to in an otherwise admissible confession should in no
sense provide the state with a free pass to "get in" the unrelated
55.
56.
(1954).
57.
58.
59.
60.

See LA. R.S. 15:446 (1950).
For general discussion of the problem, see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 56
251 La.
State v.
State v.
State v.

827, 206 So.2d 510 (1968), writs granted, 89 S. Ct. 388 (1968).
Maney, 242 La. 223, 135 So.2d 473 (1961).
Evans, 249 La. 861, 192 So.2d 103 (1966).
Bailey, 223 La. 40, 96 So.2d 34 (1957).
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crime. In the foundation case of State v. Bailey, the district attorney himself offered to delete, with consent of defense counsel,
that portion of the confessions which referred to the prior
conviction. Upon refusal of defense counsel, the district attorney
offered the confessions in evidence and at his request, the trial
judge instructed the jury to disregardthat portion of the confessions which dealt with the past conviction. In light of the
foregoing, the court stated:
"Under the circumstances presented, appellant is in no
position to complain. Moreover, to sustain counsel's contention would ipso facto render every confession inadmissible
when reference is made therein by the declarant to a prior
conviction of an unrelated crime. This is not reasonable nor
is it the law. See State v. Jones, 211 La. 387, 30 So.2d 127,
130."(;1 (Emphasis added.)
It is submitted that rather than interpret R.S. 15:450 as
giving the state the right to have the entire confession come in,
it would be more in keeping with the spirit of the section to
construe it to mean that the defendant has the right to force the
state to introduce the confession in its entirety. Where, however,
inadmissible portions of the confession can be excised without
affecting the remainder, defendant should be privileged to force
the excision. In the event excision is impossible, defendant
should at least be entitled to jury instructions to disregard the
otherwise inadmissible evidence.
FoundationRequirement for Admissions
From a negative implication it found in R.S. 15:454,62 the
Louisiana Supreme Court, as long ago as 1949, concluded that
the free and voluntary foundation required for a confession is
also applicable to admissions involving criminal intent or inculpatory facts.bC It can be argued that the negative implication
of the statute applies only to admissions involving criminal in61. Id. at 56, 96 So.2d at 40. Although the Jones case was actually decided
on other grounds, it cites and quotes from authorities which in general seem to
this writer to support the interpretation of 15:450 urged in the instant discussion.
62. LA. R.S. 15:454 (1950) provides: "The rule that a confession produced
by threat or promise is inadmissible in evidence does not apply to admissions not
involving the existence of a criminal intent."
63. State v. Robinson, 215 La. 974, 41 So.2d 848 (1949). See the discussion
in 17 LA. L. REv. 421, 424 (1957).
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tent, and not necessarily to all admissions of inculpatory facts.
Making this argument forcefully, but recognizing that there are
a number of decisions which have held that a free and voluntary
foundation is necessary for any inculpatory statement, the Supreme Court in State v. Andrus64 took the position that the
foundation is not required for all inculpatory statements-only
confessions and those involving criminal intent. The court
pointed out that the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which
went into effect January 1, 1967, contains provisions making
certain rules applicable to both confessions and inculpatory
statements "without drawing the [abovementioned] distinction. ' ' 5 The court stated that as a consequence "some confusion
or conflict may possibly result,"66 but stated that this is a matter
which addresses itself to the legislature rather than to the courts.
It may be in order, therefore, for the legislature either to amend
15:454 to include all inculpatory statements, or to change the
articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this regard.
Search and Seizure-"Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"
Evidence illegally seized is inadmissible in state and federal
court.0 7 Presumably-again, in both state and federal courtevidence obtained in consequence of an unconstitutional seizure
is likewise inadmissible,s provided that the relationship has not
"become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint."' 9 How close a
relationship is required between the evidence and the seizure
for the evidence to be inadmissible? Sometimes a fairly remote
connection has been held to suffice. 70 Addressing itself to the
problem, the United States Supreme Court in Wong Sun v.
United States stated:
"We need not hold that all evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous
tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for
the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is 'whether, granting establishment of
64. 250 La. 765, 199 So.2d 867 (1967).
65. Id. at 803, 199 So.2d at 880. The court cites as examples articles 703 and
768 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
66. 250 La. 765, 803, 199 So.2d 867, 880 (1967).
67. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
68. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
69. Id. at 341. This quotation from Nardone was quoted approvingly in
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
70. See Smith v. United States, 344 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint.' Maguire, Evidence of Guilt,
221 (1959)."1'
State v. Jones72 presented the problem to the Louisiana Supreme Court in a fascinating factual context. Defendant was
arrested in a hotel room, and merchandise and personal property were seized. The trial court held that the arrest was illegal,
and all evidence taken as a result of the illegal arrest was suppressed. An account of the arrest, however, had been published
in the newspaper, and that was defendant's undoing, for in
response to the newspaper account, several local merchants
came forward in connection with bad checks given them by the
defendant for the seized merchandise. Defendant was tried and
convicted on these bad check charges. He unsuccessfully objected to the admissibility of the worthless checks as "fruit of
the poisonous tree"-the illegal arrest. 73 The Supreme Court
held that there was "no merit" 4 in this contention, stating:
"The circumstance that the newspaper accounts of appellant's arrest alerted the merchants, who had accepted the
worthless checks in payment for the seized merchandise,
does not justify a conclusion that the evidence used in these
prosecutions are the product of either the unlawful arrest
or seizure. This being so, the illegality of the prior arrest
75
and seizure is irrelevant."
It may well be that the United States Supreme Court would
agree. Certainly the instant case is an unusual one, and the
question is really how far the "fruit of the poisonous tree" rule
should be extended.
71. 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
72. 250 La. 1007, 201 So.2d 105 (1967).
73. An unconstitutional arrest apparently is itself a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-01
(1959).
74. Id. at 1011, 201 So.2d at 106.
75. Id. at 1012-13, 201 So.2d at 107.
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Search and Seizure-Consent
Under what circumstances is a person to be deemed to have
"consented" to a search without a warrant, or to have waived
his right to object to the admission of evidence obtained as a
result of a unconstitutional search and seizure? Two cases dur76
ing the past term dealt with the problem.
Evidence Obtained as a Result of an Illegal Arrest
by a Private Individual
Are the Mapp77 and Wong Sun 7 rules to be interpreted to
preclude admissibility of tangible or intangible evidence obtained
79
as the result of an illegal arrest made by private individuals ?
The matter was considered by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in State v. Kemp.8 0 Relying in part on the 1920 United States
Supreme Court decision in Burdeau v. McDowell,"' the Louisiana court answered in the negative. Whether in the future the
United States Supreme Court will adhere to its position in
Burdeau will be interesting to watch.
CONSOLIDATION AND SEVERANCE

Compulsory Process and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination
In State v. Kemp,s2 two defendants were separately indicted
for aggravated assault upon the same individual. The cases were
consolidated, and at the trial there was evidence indicating that
one of the defendants had fired upon the victim while the other
waited in a getaway car. Each defendant had objected to the
consolidation on the grounds that each desired to call the other
as a witness. It was argued, inter alia, that the consolidation
76. State v. Andrus, 250 La. 765, 199 So.2d 867 (1967) (consent to search
and seizure by a party then under arrest), and State v. Fox, 251 La. 464, 205
So.2d 42 (1967) (waiver of right to object). For an excellent discussion of waiver
of constitutional rights in this area, see Comment, Post-Conviction Remedies and
Waiver of Constitutional Rights, 26 LA. L. REV. 705 (1966). For another case
during the past term dealing with waiver, or at least the loss of constitutional
rights, see State v. Palmer, 251 La. 759, 206 So.2d 485 (1968).
77. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
78. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
79. For an analogous problem, see State v. Evans, 249 La. 861, 192 So.2d
103 (1966), discussed in 28 LA. L. REv. 435 (1968).

80. 251 La. 592, 205 So.2d 411 (1968).
81. 256 U.S. 465 (1920).
82. 251 La. 592, 205 So.2d 411 (1968).
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thus deprived each of the defendants of the right to compulsory
process of the other. The argument was rejected by the Supreme
Court which reasoned that even if tried separately, the other
party, when called as a witness, could have asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. This approach, however, does
not seem wholly satisfying. If defendants had been tried separately, clearly each could have forced the other to take the
stand and assert his privilege in open court, thereby acquiring
whatever advantage might accrue.8 3 On the other hand, traditionally, a defendant has the right not merely not to testify,
but not to be called to the stand-at least, not by the state. It
would have been interesting to see what would have happened
in the instant case had the defendants actually attempted each
to call the other to the stand. Would the refusal by the court in
this context have constituted a denial of compulsory process?
If each had been permitted to call the other, however, serious
problems as to the violation of the privilege against selfincrimination would have been presented. Perhaps the solution
is that the defendants should have been tried separately.
LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS

An out of court confession is normally admissible in court
only against the defendant who made it. 4 Where two defendants
are tried jointly for the same crime, and the prosecutor offers
a confession by one of the defendants implicating not only himself but also the other defendant, are limiting instructions adequate to protect the non-confessing defendant? In State v.
Hopper 5 defendants' confessions each implicated the other, and,
before trial, each applied unsuccessfully for severance. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of severance, taking the position that the limiting instructions given
the jury with respect to the confessions sufficed to protect defendants' rights. A later decision by the United States Supreme
83. Prior to the time a witness takes the stand, theoretically at least, one does
not know whether the witness will assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
84. State v. West, 45 La. Ann. 928, 13 So. 173 (1893).
85. 251 La. 77, 203 So.2d 222 (1967).
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Court 8 in this area reflects great skepticism as to the efficacy
of such instructions to protect the accuseds' constitutional right
of confrontation.s 7 Whether Hopper will ultimately be upheld by
the United States Supreme Court will be interesting to watch. 88
86. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
87. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1963), holding the sixth amendment
right of confrontation applicable to the states through the fourteenth.
88. On June 17, 1968, the United States Supreme Court granted Hopper's
application and remanded it to the Louisiana Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) and Roberts v.
Russell, 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968). As the Law Review goes to press the Louisiana
Supreme Court, on reconsideration, two justices dissenting, reaffirmed the conviction, distinguishing the Bruton and Roberts cases.

